

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T  
OXCART

BYE 44003-66  
Cyt 2 of 4

30 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Possible Chinese Reactions to the OXCART Program

1. What might the Chinese do with respect to the deployment of OXCART to Okinawa and its successful use over China (Chinese reactions to a shootdown are discussed in SNIE 10-2-66)?
2. They might raise a great public fuss over the deployment itself, drawing on the vehicle's identification as a military nuclear-capable aircraft and directing their pressures against Japan. This could go so far as to fan popular fears of war.
3. They might, contrary to our estimate in SNIE 10-2-66, do the same upon the occasion of a successful penetration.
4. They might send sabotage teams against the aircraft at Kadens.
5. They might go to war, either in Vietnam or somewhere else around their border.

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6. The last of these possibilities seems wildly improbable to us; it becomes conceivable only if we construct a context of simultaneous US moves, seen by China as gravely threatening, in which the OKCART operation appears to Peiping as US target collection just prior to hostilities. The other possibilities are not so wild. With respect to the first two, dealing with public campaigns, SNIE 10-2-66 estimates that Sato could probably deal with the situation.

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